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ABSTRACT
Internet of Things (IoT) devices/sensors/endpoints (collectively and generally IoT
devices) are becoming part and parcel of many establishments. With the inbuilt support for
Wi-Fi 6, also known as “AX Wi-Fi" or "802.11ax Wi-Fi,” in many IoT devices, the number
of deployed IoT devices will continue grow. Wi-Fi® is trademark of the Wi-Fi Alliance.
These IoT devices come from various manufacturers and will require network/Internet
access for firmware upgrades. As such, there is a need to create a secure and tested
firmware upgrade environment for such devices. Presented herein are techniques to track
the firmware of IoT devices and use Manufacturer Usage Descriptions (MUD) to recognize
the recommended firmware and settings. Further, the techniques presented herein include
a mechanism to optimize firmware upgrades using Target Wake Time (TWT) scheduling.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION
It is expected that, within the next two years, more than twenty (20) billion IoT
devices will be network connected. In particularly, it is expected that more and more
enterprises and industries will onboard IoT devices, such as cameras, Smart Lights, sensors,
etc., and that most of these devices will connect over various wireless networks. With WiFi 6, large amounts of devices can connect and be spread across a large geographic area
(large cells and multiple cells).
Additionally, with Uplink Orthogonal Division Multiple Access (UL OFDMA)
capabilities in Wi-Fi 6, access points are able to sustain a much greater number of active
associations, relative to previous versions of Wi-Fi (e.g., up to 4K endpoints may be
associated to a single 11ax access point, and the protocol was designed to allow for that
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many active clients). The IoT devices can be deployed across large areas (like smart cities)
and in networks with reduced or no direct connectivity to the Internet.
Ensuring that all deployed IoT devices run the most update to date firmware is
mandatory to avoid, for example, potential security attacks. However, such update logic
comes with various challenges, such as:
1. How to identify the availability of firmware;
2. How to distribute upgrades in a safe and secure manner to a large number of
endpoints; and
3. How to validate that the new firmware is valid (authentic) and is not causing
issues.
In a pull model (where IoT devices contact an update server at regular intervals),
the attack surface is wide (e.g., between the discovery of a new exploit and the next updatepull cycle, a large number of clients may be exposed). In a push model (where a server
pushes the update to the individual clients), Man-in-the Middle (MItM) attacks are possible
and, as such, fake firmware may be distributed to clients. In both the push and pull models,
the requirement to 'keep the pipe open' between all clients and all possible update servers
makes large scale management impossible.
Presented herein are techniques to address the above challenges by combining
novel MUD and Wi-FI 6 capabilities in complementary ways. MUD is well-known, but
has conventionally been intended to carry policy information. In contrast, the techniques
presented herein extend MUD intent by allowing it to carry implementation and state
information (e.g., about the device, the firmware it runs, device needs, the tolerance to
delay, the change of behavior after upgrade, etc.).
The concepts of IoT firmware updates and the updating of large quantity of devices
have been explored. However, Wi-Fi 6 devices present specific constraints and
optimization opportunities that have not been explored yet, and that are specifically
addressed by the techniques presented herein.
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Background:
The updating firmware on IoT devices requires the following:


Identifying if there is an update for the IoT device and assessing its
criticality (e.g,. is it a security patch or just a feature update).



Accessing the verified copy of the firmware update.



Distributing the firmware in an efficient manner and quickly ensuring
devices are awake and ready to process the image when they are ready to
go.

In the world of IoT, there are two main models to fulfil the above requirements:


In a pull model, the IoT device attempts to connect to update servers at
regular intervals. This model is problematic for emergency or security
updates (as the device may not attempt the update until its next update pull
cycle).



In a push model, the management platform can initiate an update at any time
when the IoT device is awake and connected. A limitation of this model,
for emergency updates, is that the vendor may need to update 'now' 'all'
devices on the planet, which presents obvious scalability issues (and it is
difficult to explain to a customer that their IoT device was compromised
because it was lower on the list of devices to update urgently, as other
customers were 'more important').

Both of the push and pull models also suffer from the device update orchestration
problem. The server can know which devices have been updated, but does not know when
non-updated devices are going to update next (in a pull model), or why they haven't been
updated yet (in push/pull models where IoT devices are unreachable by the server).
Similarly, local OT management systems may know which devices have received an
update, but network elements do not have that knowledge, thus potentially allowing unsafe
devices to continue operating without the required update. For example, in 2017, five
Nissan Renault factories were crippled due to the Wannacry ransomware attack which
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froze HMI workstations on their factory floor. These were HMI stations running older,
unpatched versions of Windows in their industrial automation system.
The techniques presented herein addresses this issue, especially in the context of
802.11ax environments, as an illustration of the method in wireless environments where
data exchange can be scheduled.

Acquiring Information about Device Firmware Update:
In the examples presented herein, each object is associated to an object group that
the group documents the object type. Additionally, every IoT device adhering to the MUD
architecture must send a URI after every reboot and ask for a new MUD file. This is
proxied via the MUD controller. This URI can be cached for a group of IoT devices
(Grouping of IoT devices based on MUD is prior art). The techniques presented propose
an enhancement to the MUD exchange with several additional elements which take into
account 11ax devices.
First, the MUD URI is augmented to include the current firmware version. This is
an extension to RFC 8520, but is different from the current art. RFC 8520 allows the URI
to contain in the identifier of the MUD file a path that can indicate the firmware version
requested

by

the

IoT

myvendor.com/object/filev43).

device

(e.g.,

myvendor.com/object/v43/file

or

As the MUD URI is hard coded in the device, this

provision forces the vendor to install, in that location, a new version of the firmware (e.g.
v44) when updates are needed, which creates complexity. In the techniques presented
herein, the version of the firmware is appended to the MUD URI, separated by a wellknown special character (e.g., myvendor.com/object/file<br>v43). This information is
stripped by the MUD controller and retained for future use.
Other embodiments may provide the firmware version in a different structure, such
as: an 802.11 IE at association time or in a null frame; a second frame following the MUD
URI, etc. In all cases, the firmware version is obtained along with the MUD file, but does
not reflect the version that the IoT device is attempting to obtain, but rather the version that
the IoT device is currently running.
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Next, the MUD file returned by the vendor includes several new components. First,
the MUD file returned by the vendor includes the current recommended firmware version,
size, release date and criticality level. In the current art, the MUD file defines access rules,
but not firmware versions. The techniques presented herein use MUD in a new way to
carry this information and to indicate the manufacturer's recommenced firmware (and
therefore configuration) state. As a result, the MUD controller has a record of the
discrepancy. As such, MUD is no longer a policy tool, but instead becomes a tool to
exchange state information (state of the device, mentioning its current firmware version in
the request, expected state returned by the vendor).
Second, the MUD file returned by the vendor includes the location of the server
from where the firmware update can be obtained. Third, the MUD file returned by the
vendor includes Wi-Fi6 delay tolerance and RU information, as per the below.
The change of device behavior expected after the update is now addressed. In the
context of the examples presented herein, the behavior describes the TWT and RU profile
that will be used for the IoT device. It is noted that, in 802.11ax, IoT devices can conserve
battery and only wake up at Target Wake Times. The IoT device can request a TWT
interval from the AP. The AP also implements a scheduler and can override the IoT device
requested TWT interval. It follows that an IoT device may send several types of traffic.
As such, the IoT device may request TWTs matching the traffic type and configured
communication interval. Depending on the traffic, delaying TWT (due to AP override) may
be tolerable only to a certain delay value.
The current art related to MUD describes access rules that the network elements
can use to determine the IoT device's requirements. The techniques presented herein
extend MUD to also insert an override tolerance element that includes the expected traffic
volume at each TWT, but also the IoT device tolerance to TWT delay or traffic starvation.
Such tolerance depends on the vendor application and the vendor chipset. This new
dimension informs the network as to how much the network can deviate from the elements
provided by the vendor. The combination of firmware size and delay tolerance is used in
two ways:
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1. The AP can now allocate the proper RU structure for the IoT device firmware
update, having knowledge both of the update size and the IoT device tolerance
to additional transmission delay for each next packet.
2. The AP can now build an upstream OFDMA scheduler that not only accounts
for the expected traffic volume for each client, but also the individual tolerance
to override and delay (thus preventing layer 7 failures for excessive delays).
As detailed above, the techniques presented herein focus on 802.11ax, where the
need for such a solution is clearly emerging. However, the same method could be applied
to other scheduled wireless technologies.
In a pull model, for each known MUD URI, the MUD controller periodically
triggers the MUD file request on behalf of the IoT Device Group and looks for any
recommended firmware updates. In a push model, the MUD controller registers as a virtual
IoT device in order to receive the updates. This is shown below in FIG. 1.

FIG. 1
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Distributing the Firmware:
Certain network management system can maintain a list of the identified IoT
devices, their current firmware version, connection state, Target Wake up Time and
currently associated AP. In one embodiment, a network management system publishes to
the AP (or WLC) a list of IoT clients with their firmware status (in a simplified format, this
could be limited to 'current vs update due').
As the MUD controller signals a firmware update for a group of objects, the
network management system downloads a copy of the firmware on behalf of the device
and keeps a local copy. This mechanism avoids any issues arising due to non-availability
of the Internet or possible congestion when the IoT devices (or tens of thousands of them)
wake up at the same time. However, this mechanism is optional.
During the next transmission from such a client for which firmware is available,
the AP will modify the IoT device's TWT profile to remain awake and receive the firmware
(forcing the device to stay awake). When more than one IoT device awakens at the same
time, the AP uses the MUD TWT override tolerance value to distribute the IoT devices
across the next wake time and limit the count of concurrent requests to the update server.
The implementation of this method becomes a combinatorics problem, where m objects of
n different types need to download firmware files of individual size k over bursts separated
by at most i milliseconds (/seconds, /minutes etc.). Each firmware may have a QoS value
and be integrated in the standard QoS distribution model. The distribution scheme can use
known mechanisms such as permutation routing on RN(p,k) (AKA Datta-Zomaya
distribution). However, the application of combinatoric distribution (such as the DattaZomaya) in the context of IoT firmware distribution is new, as the original intent of such
distribution was energy efficiency on a shared link for the transmitter, not a time efficiency
for the receivers in the time domain. It should be noted that other, possible more
rudimentary schemes, are possible (e.g., implementing a Lovasz-Schrijver relaxation of the
scheduler around the median of the TWT tolerance).
In all cases, the contribution of the techniques presented herein is to organize the
devices in groups, and organize a TWT rotation cycle, where groups TWTs are
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progressively expanded over time until the update cycle starts, so that the start of the next
TWT group (at update time) corresponds to (after) the time at which the update push to the
previous group has completed. Then, during each group update period, the AP allocates
the RUs to each device that match the delay tolerance maximum. It is possible that the
delay tolerance would allow for inter-TWT bleed, where a first group would receive a first
update burst, go to sleep while a second group receives the first update burst, then the first
group receives the second burst (firmware update continuation) while the second group
sleeps.
In another embodiment, the AP also restricts the communication of devices with
'update due' status to the update server. This mode can be adapted depending on the update
criticality level.
The MUD controller also distributes the TWT tolerance value to the WLC, where
this information is used, in combination with the number of IoT devices of each type within
each cell, to build a new longer term TWT schedule that is optimized for the overall traffic
managed by the AP while respecting the TWT constraint tolerance. This is shown below
in FIG. 2.

FIG. 2
Firmware Issue Prediction:
A typical device will reboot after the firmware upgrade and re-connect. The AP
implements the schedule as above. In parallel, the AP forwards, to the network
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management system, the TWT requests made by the IoT client. The network management
system compares the TWT schedule before and after the firmware upgrade and monitors
the device for its behavior and data upload patterns. This will be compared against the
MUD file content which also defines any new or updated behavior.
If the device is not sending any data or sending spurious data which is not compliant
to MUD file description, then the firmware upgrade to other devices can be stopped and
an admin can be notified (if deviation follows the upgrade). A device can also be isolated
in a specific VLAN, if the device starts displaying TWT behaviors outside of the MUD
description.
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